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JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2A-3(2)(h), the Utah Court of 
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over: (h) cases transferred to 
the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. This Court, 
accordingly, has jurisdiction to consider this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues on appeal which pertain to respondent Okubo 
are: 
1. Whether the trial court properly dismissed the 
plaintiffs1 Complaint against Dr. Okubo on the grounds that the 
plaintiffs failed to procure the expert testimony necessary to 
etablish Dr. Okubo's alleged breach of the standard of care 
relevant to the case. 
2. Whether the trial court's summary judgment dismissal 
of the plaintiffs' Complaint against Dr. Okubo was proper based 
on the grounds that Dr. Okubo's allegedly negligent conduct was 
not, as a matter of law, the proximate cause of Tiffany Ruth 
Butterfield1s death. 
3. Whether the trial court properly denied the 
plaintiffs1 motion to extend the discovery period. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Dr. Okubo hereby incorporates by reference the statement 
of the case found on pages 2 and 3 of Dr. Nickol's brief. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff, Tiffany Ruth Butterfield ("Tiffany"), was 
born June 30, 1984. Defendant David Okubo ("Dr. Okubo") examined 
Tiffany as part of a routine pediatric assessment shortly 
following her birth. Dr. Okubo's initial examination revealed 
that Tiffany was healthy and normal. 
2. On July 4, four days after her birth, Tiffany was 
taken to the Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital Emergency Clinic. 
The emergency chart, recorded at the time of that visit, indicated 
that Tiffany was experiencing decreased activity accompanied with 
congestion in the nose which was improved with bulb sunctioning. 
Defendant Thomas Nickol ("Dr. Nickol") examined plaintiff at that 
time and again assessed the child as normal. 
3. Tiffany's first and only visit to Dr. Okubo's office 
occurred on July 16, 1984. (Deposition of Angela Butterfield, at 
pp. 20, 2 3 and 24, attached as Addendum "A". See also Transcript 
of December 23, 1987 Hearing, p. 7, line 9.) 
4. During the July 16 visit, Dr. Okubo obtained a 
history from Mrs. Butterfield and examined the child. His office 
notes indicate that Tiffany had some history of "gasps" without 
any skin discoloration or reflux. Dr. Okubo's notes also indicate 
that Tiffany had an active, demanding temperment. 
5. The Butterfields sought the services of another 
physician following the July 16 visit with Dr. Okubo. Dr. Okubo 
never saw Tiffany again and never conferred with the Butterfields 
after the July 16 visit. See Transcript of December 23, 1987 
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Hearing, p. 7, line 11. The Butterfields had decided shortly 
after the July 16 visit that Dr. Okubo would no longer be 
Tiffany's pediatrician. (Addendum "A".) 
6. One month after the July 16 visit, on August 16, 
1984, Tiffany was again taken to the emergency room of Jordan 
Valley Hospital. She was again examined by Dr. Nickol. The 
Butterfields reported to Dr. Nickol that Tiffany was experiencing 
an irregular breathing pattern with one occasion on which Tiffany 
did not breathe for four seconds, although no skin discoloration 
was noted on that occasion. (See Addendum B of Nickol Brief.) 
Dr. Nickol assessed the child as normal for her age and suggested 
to the parents that they watch the child carefully to observe any 
increased respiratory distress with cyanosis or blue 
discoloration. Dr. Nickol suggested to the Butterfields that 
Tiffany be taken back to Dr. Okubo in the latter part of July or 
early August for a two-month checkup. The Butterfields did not go 
back to Dr. Okubo. 
7. On August 31, 1984, the Butterfields took plaintiff 
to Dr. Monty McClellan ("Dr. McClellan"), a family practitioner, 
for a routine checkup. Dr. McClellan again saw Tiffany on 
September 27, November 5, November 30, and December 14, 1984. 
(Deposition of Monty McClellan, pp. 7-11, attached hereto as 
Addendum "B".) 
8. On December 20, Tiffany died from sudden infant death 
syndrome while at home. From the time of Dr. Okubo's last contact 
with Tiffany on July 16 and her death on December 20, over five 
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months had elapsed, 
9. On December 10, 19 87, Dr. Okubo moved for summary 
judgment against defendant. (R. pp. 116-125.) In essence, Dr. 
Okubo moved for summary judgment on the ground that the 
Butterfields had not obtained a pediatrician or any other expert 
witness to testify that Dr. Okubo had deviated from the standard 
of care in his treatment of Tiffany at the trial scheduled to 
begin on January 11, 1988. At the time the motion was filed, the 
Butterfields had indicated by answer to interrogatories that they 
intended to rely on the testimony of Dr. Monty McClellan to 
establish what they alleged was the breach of the standard of care 
in the treatment of their daughter. (See Answer to Interrogatory 
11, attached as Addendum "F" to Nickol Brief.) During his 
deposition, however, Dr. McClellan admitted that he had never been 
requested by the Butterfields to testify at trial and did not 
intend to testify at trial. (Dr. McClelland Deposition, p. 47, 
attached as Addendum "B".) Plaintiffs conceded at the summary 
judgment hearing that they did not intend to rely upon Dr. 
McClellan to provide expert medical testimony. (See Transcript of 
Summary Judgment Hearing, R. 212 at p. 17.) 
10. In contrast to the Butterfields, Dr. Okubo had 
produced an affidavit from Dr. Dennis Nielson stating that Dr. 
Okubo did not deviate from the applicable standard of care in 
failing to recommend the use of a home apnea monitor even if the 
Butterfields1 testimony is believed. Dr. Nielson is a Board 
certified Utah pediatrician and Director of the Pediatric 
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Pulmonary Function Laboratory at the University of Utah Hospital 
and Primary Children's Medical Center. He is also a member of the 
Sudden Infant Death Advisory Council of the Utah State Department 
of Health. (R. pp. 55-56. See also Nielson Affidavit, attached 
as Addendum "Cff. ) 
11. On December 21, 1987, 11 days after the motion for 
summary judgment had been filed and two days before it was to be 
heard, the Butterfields obtained an affidavit from Dr. H. Barry 
Jacobs in which Dr. Jacobs alleges that Dr. Okubo fell below the 
standard of care in his treatment of Tiffany. (See Jacobs 
Affidavit, attached hereto as Addendum "D".) Although plaintiffs 
claim that the affidavit of Dr. Jacobs was delivered on December 
22, 1987 at the law offices of counsel for Dr. Okubo, that 
particular fact was disputed at the lower court hearing of December 
23, 1987. Counsel for Dr. Okubo worked at his office until around 
6:00 p.m. on December 22, 1987 and had not received a copy of Dr. 
Jacobs' affidavit nor was he aware of the affidavit by that time. 
The following day, counsel went directly from his home to the court 
for the December 2 3 hearing and that was the first that he saw of 
the Dr. Jacobs affidavit. Counsel called his office to inquire 
whether a copy of the affidavit had been delivered and no one at 
the office could locate a copy of the affidavit. (See Transcript 
of December 23, 1987 Hearing at pp. 6, 15 and 28.) 
12. The trial court granted Dr. Okubo's summary judgment 
motion as well as summary judgment motions filed by the other 
defendants, on January 27, 1988, ruling that the Butterfields had 
-5-
not established through competent or qualified expert testimony 
that Dr- Okubo breached the requisite standard of care required of 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AGAINST DR. OKUBO ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAD FAILED 
TO PRODUCE COMPETENT MEDICAL EXPERT 
TESTIMONY. 
A. The Requirement of Competent Medical Expert Testimony 
Generally. 
Plaintiffs concede that they need to produce expert 
testimony in order to establish the standard of care owed by 
defendants. This has long been the holding of the Utah Supreme 
Court: 
In the majority of malpractice cases, the 
plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to 
establish [the requisite] standard of care. 
Expert testimony is required because the 
nature of the profession removes the 
particularities of its practice from the 
knowledge and understanding of the average 
citizen. 
Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 at 352 (Utah 1980). 
Another general rule that has been applied in Utah and 
which has been fully explained in the brief of defendant Dr. 
Thomas Nickol on pages 16 and 17 is that ordinarily a physician 
from one school of medicine is not competent to testify as an 
expert in a malpractice action against a physician of another 
school. See Burton v. Youngblood, 711 P.2d 245 (Utah 1984). An 
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exception to this general rule exists when there has been a 
showing that the medical expert offered by the plaintiff has the 
knowledge and familiarity with the standard of care and treatment 
commonly practiced by physicians engaged in the defendant's 
specialty. Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337 at 339 (Utah 1987). 
B. Plaintiffs' Medical Expert Testimony. 
As was discussed in the Statement of Facts and is also 
covered in the brief of defendant Dr. Thomas Nickol, the 
plaintiffs' first proposed expert, Dr. McClellan, clearly stated 
in his deposition that he did not anticipate testifying as an 
expert in this case and was never asked to do so. Plaintiffs' 
counsel clearly represented to the court at the December 23, 1987 
hearing that plaintiffs did not intend to use Dr. McClellan as an 
expert in the case. Consequently, the only medical expert 
testimony presented by plaintiffs was the affidavit of Dr. Jacobs 
which was presented for the first time at the hearing on December 
23. Consequently, the adequacy of the affidavit in establishing 
the competency of Dr. Jacobs and the timeliness of the 
presentation of the affidavit are critical to a determination of 
whether the trial court correctly ruled that there had been no 
competent medical testimony presented. 
C. The Affidavit of Dr. Jacobs is Insufficient to 
Establish Competent Medical Testimony in This Case. 
The analysis of whether an affidavit in response to a 
motion for summary judgment can successfully raise a genuine issue 
of material fact begins with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). 
That rule states five requirements of affidavits which respond to 
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motions for summary judgment: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made [1] on personal knowledge, [2] shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and [3] shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. 
[4] Sworn or certified copies of all papers 
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits 
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided 
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavit or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must [5] 
set forth specific facts showing that there 
is a genuine issue for trial. If he does 
not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(numbering supplied). The Jacobs affidavit fails to contain the 
type of particularized, affirmative showing necessary under Rule 
56(e), as will be fully discussed and analyzed below: 
1. Dr. Jacobs1 Claim of Experience in Pediatrics. 
Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit makes it clear that he is not a 
pediatrician but a general surgeon licensed to practice that 
specialty in Maryland. He nevertheless attempts to establish his 
competence in pediatrics with the following statement in paragraph 
. . . I have past experience in . . . 
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in 
private practice and hospitals, including 
the Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C. 
The Arizona case of Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz.App. 
1978), considers the question of whether such a claim is 
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sufficient to give one specialist competence to testify against a 
physician in another specialty: 
In the present case, none of the plaintiff's 
witnesses demonstrated any significant 
familiarity with the medical standards to 
which an orthopedic surgeon must adhere. 
The witness who had perhaps the greatest 
opportunity to acquire knowledge of 
orthopedic procedures was Dr. Rocovich. 
Although a neurosurgeon, he had served on 
the staff of an orthopedic hospital, had 
discussed lumbar diskograms with orthopedic 
surgeons, and had sometimes worked with 
orthopedic surgeons on the same patient. We 
do not believe that these facts alone showed 
such a familiarity with the orthopedic 
standards of care as to require a finding 
that the trial judge abused his discretion 
in refusing to admit Dr. Rocovichfs 
testimony. 
558 P.2d at 346-47. If anything, the Dr. Rocovich who was 
referred to in the above quote had a much more specific and 
detailed claim to the kind of competence necessary to testify 
against a member of another specialty than does Dr. Jacobs. Dr. 
Jacobs doesn't suggest that he has treated the SIDS related 
symptomatology with Utah pediatricians. 
Even without the guidance provided by Gaston, it would be 
apparent that Dr. Jacobs' reference to his experience at the 
Children's Hospital is not an "affirmative" showing of competence 
within the meaning of Rule 56(e). Dr. Jacobs does not indicate 
what kind of pediatrics experience he has. He does not indicate 
how many of his patients were children. He does not indicate what 
kind of experience he had at the Children's Hospital in Washington, 
D.C. He certainly doesn't indicate any expertise with sudden 
infant death syndrome. Nowhere does he indicate that he is 
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familiar with the use of home apnea monitors. (See Addendum "E".) 
In contrast, Dr. Okubo had presented to the court the affidavit of 
Dr. Dennis Nielson, a Board certified Utah pediatrician and 
Director of the Pediatric Pulmc>nary Function Laboratory at the 
University of Utah Hospital and Primary Children's Medical Center. 
In addition, he is a member of the Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 
Advisory Council for the State Department of Health. His affidavit 
very clearly presented to the court competent expert medical 
testimony that Dr. Okubo did not deviate from the standard of care 
required of him even if all of the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. 
Butterfield is believed. 
In analyzing whether Dr. Jacobs has affirmatively shown 
his competence to testify as to the matters stated in his 
affidavit, it is important to remember that Dr. Jacobs has an 
enhanced obligation to show his competence because he is not a 
pediatrician. What might be a satisfactory "affirmative showing" 
of competence in an affidavit from another pediatrician like Dr. 
Okubo will not be sufficient in an affidavit from a general 
surgeon like Dr. Jacobs. Because of the requirements of Burton 
and Martin, supra, Dr. Jacobs1 alleged showing of competence must 
be especially persuasive. 
2. Dr. Jacobs1 Claim of Familiarity With the 
Standard of Care Required in Pediatrics in 1984. 
Dr. Jacobs' further attempt to affirmatively show his 
competence is contained in paragraph 3 of the affidavit: 
I am familiar with the Standard of Care, 
applicable in 1984, required in pediatrics 
-10-
To simply claim, without explanation, to be familiar with the 
standard of care required in another medical specialty is 
insufficient to establish a showing of competence on the part of a 
physician from a different specialty, Bethea v. Smith, 336 S.E.2d 
295 (Ga.App. 1985). In Bethea, the plaintiff sued his orthopedic 
surgeon for alleged negligent treatment of the plaintiff's 
fractured right ankle. The orthopedic surgeon moved for summary 
judgment. The plaintiff resisted the motion for summary judgment 
by providing the court with an affidavit from a podiatrist opining 
that the orthopedic surgeon was negligent. The trial court denied 
the motion for summary judgment. On review, the Georgia Court of 
Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant's summary judgment 
should have been granted because the affidavit from the podiatrist 
was not sufficient to set forth the podiatrist's competence to 
testify against an orthopedic surgeon. Interestingly, the 
podiatrist's alleged showing of competence is very similar to the 
showing of competence with which Dr. Jacobs attempts in his 
affidavit: 
The affiant set forth his qualifications and 
stated that [1] he was familiar with the 
standard of care and treatment practiced by 
"the medical profession generally" with 
respect to the type of diagnosis and 
treatment involved in the care of appellee 
by appellant Bethea, [2] that he had 
examined appellee and appellee's medical 
records, [3] and that he had personal 
knowledge of the facts of the case. [4] It 
was the affiant's opinion "that the standard 
of care as it pertains to the medical 
profession generally, that being the degree 
of skill and care employed by the medical 
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profession generally under similar 
conditions and like surrounding 
circumstances was not followed in the course 
and treatment of [appellee] by [appellant 
Bethea]." 
336 S.E.2d at 296-297. Like the podiatrist in Bethea, Dr. Jacobs 
states, with very little explanation, that he is familiar with the 
standard of care required of pediatricians, and he further alleges 
with little elaboration that the defendants in a medical 
malpractice action have fallen below the standard of care required 
of them. Such allegations were properly found inadequate in 
Bethea. 
Dr. Jacobs' claim that he is "familiar with the Standard 
of Care, applicable in 1984 required in pediatrics . . ." 
establishes no more than a passing knowledge of the specialty --
insufficient to qualify Dr. Jacobs as an expert to testify 
against Dr. Okubo. "More than a casual familiarity with the 
specialty of the defendant physician is required" in order to 
qualify a physician in one specialty to testify against a 
physician in another specialty. Gaston v. Hunter, supra, 588 P.2d 
at 346. See also, Connelly v. Kortz, 689 P.2d 728, 730 (Colo.App. 
1984). At least one court has held that before an expert from one 
specialty may testify against an expert from another specialty, 
the former must be equally as familiar with the standard of care 
required of the latter as a practitioner of the latter specialty. 
Whitehurst v. Boehm, 255 S.E.2d 761 (N.C.App. 1979). Nothing in 
Dr. Jacobs' affidavit establishes that he is "equally familiar" 
with the standard of care required of Utah pediatricians. 
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3. The Affidavit is Defective Because it Fails to 
Address the Question of Whether a General Surgeon 
Would Treat The Infant Plaintiff With the Same 
Procedures a Pediatrician Would Employ. 
It is significant that nothing in Dr. Jacobs' affidavit 
states or even suggests that the method of treatment for Tiffany 
Butterfield would be the same for a general surgeon as for a 
pediatrician. Dr. Jacobs does not even address this question, yet 
it is the sine quo non for the admissibility of testimony by one 
physician against a physician from a different specialty in Utah 
and most other states. This rule was specifically upheld in 
Burton v. Youngblood, supra, where the court upheld the rejection 
of a specialist's testimony when he could not state unquivocally 
that an occular plastic surgeon would employ the same procedures 
to perform an upper eyelid blepharoplasty as would be used by a 
plastic surgeon. 
The "common method of treatment" prerequisite to 
admissibility was also enforced by the Arizona Court of Appeals in 
Gaston v. Hunter, supra. The court rejected the testimony of a 
neurosurgeon against the defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, even 
though the neurosurgeon testified that the criteria for 
intervention in neurosurgery and orthopedic surgery for disk 
disease (the condition for which the defendant had treated the 
plaintiff) were the same. For similar holdings, see Caro v. 
Bumpus, 491 P.2d 606 (Colo.App. 1971) (Rejecting the testimony of 
doctors of medicine in a malpractice action against an osteopathic 
physician and surgeon); James v. Falk, 360 P.2d 546 (Or. 1961) 
(Reciting the general rule that one physician may testify against 
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another physician from a different specialty when both schools of 
practice follow the same precepts). The failure of Dr. Jacobs' 
affidavit to even address the issue of whether a general surgeon 
would treat Tiffany's breathing symptoms the same way a 
pediatrician would makes it fatally deficient. 
4. The Affidavit is Deficient Because it Fails to 
Establish Dr. Jacobs' Familiarity With the Local 
Standard of Care. 
Still another reason the Jacobs affidavit is deficient is 
that it fails to establish Dr. Jacobs' familiarity with the stan-
dard of care owed by pediatrians in Utah or similar localities. 
The affidavit says nothing about Dr. Jacobs' familiarity with 
Utah/similar locality pediatric practice. Dr. Jacobs states only 
that he is licensed in the State of Maryland and that he has 
experience in pediatrics having cared for patients in the 
Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C. Certainly, this is not 
enough to make Dr. Jacobs qualified to testify as to the standard 
of care owed by a pediatrician in Utah or a similar locality. The 
failure to lay such a foundation for Dr. Jacobs' testimony is 
fatal. Utah courts have long held that a witness physician may 
not testify against a malpractice defendant physician unless the 
witness can establish his familiarity with the standard of care 
owed in the defendant physician's community or in a similar 
locality. Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474 (Utah 
1979); Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978). Similar holdings 
from other jurisdictions are so numerous that reference can only 
be made to a few of the more recent cases. Loftus v. Hayden, 391 
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A.2d 749 (Del. 1978); Koch v. Gorrilla, 552 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 
1977); Brazil v. U.S., 484 F.Supp. 986 (D.C.Ala. 1979); Samuels v. 
Doctors Hospital, Inc., 414 F.Supp. 1124 (D.C.La. 1976); Searcy v. 
Manganhas, 415 N.E.2d 142 (Ind.App. 1981); Holmes v. Elliott, 443 
So.2d 825 (Miss. 1983); Ayres by Ayres v. Rutherford Hosp., Inc., 
689 S.W.2d 155 (Tenn.App. 1984); Ives v. Redford, 252 S.E.2d 315 
(Va. 1979). Dr. Jacobs' affidavit doesn't even attempt to 
suggest, however, that he is familiar with the standard of care 
owed in Utah or that the standard of care owed in Maryland is 
similar to the standard of care owed in Utah. This lack of 
foundation testimony provided the trial court with still 
additional grounds to find the Jacobs affidavit incompetent. 
D. Dr. Jacobs' Affidavit Was Not Timely Served. 
Even if Dr. Jacobs' affidavit could establish his 
competence to testify against a Utah pediatrician, the affidavit 
should be rejected because it was not timely served. Dr. Okubo 
hereby refers to pages 24 through 27 of Dr. Nickol's brief 
wherein the requirements for service of affidavits in opposition 
to a motion for summary judgment are set forth. As explained 
there, Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require 
service of opposing affidavits on the day prior to a motion for 
summary judgment hearing. Counsel for Dr. Okubo worked at his 
office until approximately 6:00 p.m. on December 22, the day prior 
to the December 23 hearing. He never received a copy of Dr. 
Jacobs' affidavit, nor was a copy of the affidavit left with anyone 
at his law office. The following day, counsel went directly from 
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his home to the hearing. It was there that he first saw the Dr. 
Jacobs affidavit. He called his office to inquire whether a copy 
of the affidavit had been delivered. At the time of the call, 
shortly before the hearing, no one could locate a copy of Dr. 
Jacobs' affidavit. All of these facts were made known to the trial 
court at the time of the hearing. (See Transcript of December 23, 
1987 Hearing at pp. 6, 15 and 28.) A copy of the affidavit was 
discovered in counsel's office following his return from the 
hearing, but there was no indication it had been delivered the day 
before or who might have received it. 
Admittedly, Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure set forth several means by which service may properly be 
accomplished: 
Delivery of a copy within this rule means: 
Handing it to the attorney or to the party, 
or leaving it at his office with his clerk 
or other person in charge thereof; or, if 
there is no one in charge, leaving it in a 
comspicuous place therein; or if the office 
is closed or the person to be served has no 
office, leaving it at his dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some person of 
suitable age and discretion then residing 
therein. 
Notwithstanding the multitude of possible means of service, 
however, the obvious intent of the rule is that counsel be 
provided with a copy of the affidavit early enough to be able to 
review it before the scheduled hearing. To leave the document in 
a law office, after usual business hours for a hearing at 9:00 
a.m. the following morning clearly violates the intent of the rule 
if not the actual requirements itself. Counsel does not know how 
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or when the delivery of the affidavit occurred, but if it was 
delivered the day before the hearing, it was done well after 5:00 
p.m. and was not left with anyone who could be classified as being 
"in charge of the office," nor did it appear to be left in a 
"conspicuous place." Consequently, it is the position of Dr. 
Okubo that the service was clearly not proper, and the trial court 
could justifiably refuse to accept it. 
E. The Trial Court Has Broad Discretion to Determine the 
Competency of an Expert Witness. 
The final point to be made with regard to the affidavit 
and testimony of Dr. Jacobs is that a Utah trial court is granted 
considerable discretion in determining whether an expert is 
qualified to give his opinion on a particular matter. Dixon v. 
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1981); Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 
636 P.2d 481 (Utah 1981). The ruling of a trial court on the 
admissibility of testimony should not be lightly disturbed on 
appeal, if at all, unless it clearly appears that the court was in 
error. Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336, 340 
(Utah 1979). The trial court!s decision to reject Dr. Jacobs' 
affidavit cannot be said to be an abuse of discretion for the many 
reasons that have been previously addressed in this brief. In 
addition, it should be noted that the court did have the evidence 
presented by the affidavit of Dr. Dennis Nielson, a Board cetified 
pediatrician, who clearly had the competence to testify as to the 
standard of care required of Dr. Okubo. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE ALLEGED 
MISCONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS WAS NOT THE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS' INJURY WAS 
CORRECT IN LIGHT OF PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO 
PRODUCE COMPETENT EXPERT TESTIMONY. EVEN IF 
SUCH LANGUAGE WAS ERROR, IT WAS HARMLESS ERROR. 
Point II of the Butterfield brief assigns error to the 
trial court's Order and Summary Judgments. The Butterfields find 
language in the Order which they interpret as a finding that the 
Butterfields caused Tiffany's death. The Butterfields claim that 
such a finding is not supported by the evidence, and that it 
constitutes reversible error. This argument may be disposed of 
briefly. First, the court's observation that "there were 
intervening events that superceded any misconduct on the part of" 
any of the defendants was not so much a finding that the 
Butterfields were at fault as it was an attempt to exonerate the 
defendants. (See Nickol Addendum "A".) The implication of the 
quoted language is that there was no action or omission on the 
part of the defendants which could be the proximate cause of 
Tiffany's death. In this regard the court is referred to Point II 
of the brief of defendant Dr. Nickol, pp. 27-30, where this issue 
is thoroughly discussed. 
With specific reference to Dr. Okubo on the issue of 
proximate cause, the court had uncontroverted medical record 
evidence before it that Dr. Okubo had not seen the infant 
plaintiff from July 16, 1984 all the way up to the infant's death 
on December 20, 1984, or a period of five full months. The 
plaintiffs admitted that shortly after the visit of July 16 that 
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they had decided to transfer the pediatric care for Tiffany from 
Dr. Okubo to the general physician, Dr. McClellan. They then took 
Tiffany to see Dr. McClellan on five occasions before her death, 
including August 31, September 27, November 5, November 30, and 
December 14, 1984. This clear remoteness of time from Dr. Okubo's 
treatment, together with the testimony presented by Dr. Dennis 
Nielson regarding Dr. Okubo's complete compliance with the 
standard of care expected of a pediatrician, presented the court 
with enough evidence to conclude that there were "intervening 
events" that must have superceded any misconduct, if any, on the 
part of defendants and which thereby insulate defendant Dr. Okubo 
from being the proximate cause of Tiffany's death. 
Even if the court's finding concerning proximate cause 
was made in the absence of sufficient uncontroverted facts, the 
language in the court's order about proximate causation and 
intervening events does not constitute reversible error, 
independent grounds exist to uphold the lower court's decision. 
The court had sufficient medical evidence to conclude that the 
defendant's conduct was not responsible for the infant's death, 
especially in light of plaintiffs' failure to produce competent 
expert testimony to the contrary. Even if the ruling as to 
proximate cause was in error, it is well established that an 
erroneous finding of fact that is unnecessary to support a court's 
decision is not grounds for reversal. Wright v. Wright, 623 P.2d 
97 (Haw.App. 1981); Newcum v. Lawson, 684 P.2d 534 (N.M.App. 
1984); and Ratzlaff v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 646 P.2d 
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586 (N.M.App. 1982). Even where a motion presents a trial judge 
with a pure question of law, and the judge erroneously enters a 
finding of fact, such a mistake is not reversible error. Gmeiner 
v. Yacte, 592 P.2d 57 (Idaho 1979). A finding that is unsupported 
by evidence is harmless error where a contrary finding would not 
affect the ultimate decision. Renfro v. J.D. Coqqlns Co., 378 
P.2d 130 (N.M. 1963) . 
Where there is sufficient evidence to support all of the 
material and decisive findings in an order or judgment, the 
presence of unsupported or immaterial findings is of no 
consequence. McLeod v. Keith, 417 P.2d 861 (Wash.2d 1966). There 
is ample evidence to support the court's finding that the 
Butterfields were unable to produce competent medical testimony to 
rebut the testimony of defendants' experts. An unsupported finding 
of fact cannot amount to reversible error under such circumstances. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO CONTINUE THE 
DISCOVERY PERIOD. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, EVEN 
IF THE REFUSAL TO CONTINUE WAS ERROR, 
INDEPENDENT GROUNDS EXIST TO AFFIRM THE 
TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The Butterfields claim that the trial court erred by 
refusing to grant their last-minute motion to extend the discovery 
cutoff. The background of the Butterfields' motion is as follows. 
On August 25, 1987, the trial court issued a scheduling order 
requiring all discovery to be completed by December 11, 1987. 
Defendant Okubo answered the Butterfields' first set of interrog-
atories on December 3, 1987, in which Okubo's expert witness was 
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designated. The Butterfields' only justification for extending the 
discovery deadline as to defendant Okubo is that the Butterfields 
did not receive Dr. Okubo's discovery responses until eight days 
before the discovery cutoff. The Butterfields claim that they 
wanted to depose Okubo's expert and needed more time to do so. The 
trial court's refusal to grant the motion to extend the discovery 
deadline as to defendant Okubo was proper for two reasons. First, 
as pointed out in the brief of defendant Nickol, the trial court's 
decisions pertaining to discovery orders must be given broad 
latitude by this court. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, of 
Salt Lake City v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1984). Trial 
courts must be afforded significant discretion to enter such 
discovery orders as they deem necessary. DeTevis v. Aragon, 727 
P.2d 558 (N.M.App. 1986). See also cases cited in brief of Dr. 
Nickol, p. 33. The trial court was in the best position to 
evaluate whether an extension of the discovery deadline was justi-
fied and whether such additional postponement of a trial date would 
serve the interests of all the parties. The trial court determined 
that no extension of the discovery deadline was necessary, and the 
trial court's discretion should not be disturbed. 
The second reason the trial court's decision should be 
upheld is that, as to defendant Okubo, the motion to extend the 
discovery deadline was not made in a timely fashion. The 
discovery cutoff occurred on December 11. The motion to extend 
the discovery period as to defendant Okubo was made on December 
23, at the summary judgment hearing. 
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Even if it can be said that the denial of the 
Butterfields' motion was an abuse of discretion, it is not grounds 
to reverse the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of 
Dr. Okubo. As is clear to anyone who reads the transcript of the 
December 2 3 hearing, the primary reason the trial court granted 
defendants' motion for summary judgment is that the Butterfields 
had failed to produce, as of the date set for hearing the motions 
for summary judgment, competent expert testimony to rebut the 
testimony provided by defendants. That fact alone justified the 
entry of summary judgment against the Butterfields -- whether or 
not it might have been preferable to allow plaintiff additional 
time to depose Dr. Okubo's expert witness. The plaintiffs had 
just as much time to come forward with competent expert testimony 
as did defendants. The propriety of the court's denial of the 
Butterfields' motion to extend the discovery deadline is 
completely independent of the propriety of the trial court's entry 
of summary judgment. A judgment should not be reversed unless 
there is error that is substantial and prejudicial and of a nature 
that without the error there would be a substantial likelihood of 
a different result. Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, 56 3 
P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977). Granting the Butterfields additional time 
to conduct discovery could not have helped the Butterfields after 
the proper entry of summary judgment against them. The Appellate 
Court can only reverse the judgment of the trial court if there is 
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have 
been a result more favorable to the complaining party. Matter of 
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Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
The entry of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Okubo 
against the Butterfields should be upheld. The Butterfields failed 
to resist Dr. Okubo's motion with competent medical evidence. Dr. 
Jacobs' unsubstantiated claim that he "has experience" at a 
children's hospital and his conclusory allegation that he is 
"familiar" with the standard of care applicable to pediatricians in 
1984 does not qualify as the affirmative showing of competence 
required under Rule 56(e). Dr. Jacobs' affidavit is also defective 
because it fails to state that a general surgeon would have treated 
Tiffany with the same procedures a pediatrician would employ, and 
the affidavit fails to establish Dr. Jacobs' familiarity with the 
local standard of care applicable to pediatricians in Utah and 
similar localities. Apart from the issue of the affidavit 
demonstrating the requisite degree of competence, the trial court 
also correctly refused to accept the testimony of Dr. Jacobs 
because the affidavit was not timely served as is required under 
the rules. The trial court's determination that Dr. Jacobs was not 
a competent expert or that the affidavit was not timely served does 
not amount to an abuse of discretion. 
In addition, the trial court's ruling that defendant's 
alleged misconduct was not the proximate cause of the infant 
plaintiff's death was proper given the evidence before the court. 
Clearly, the remoteness in time from Dr. Okubo's treatment of the 
child and her subsequent death, together with the lack of any 
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competent medical testimony presented by plaintiffs that there was 
any deviation from the standard of care, is enough to support the 
court's ruling. Even if the finding of proximate cause was in 
error, independent grounds exist to support the summary judgment. 
Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
failing to grant the additional discovery period. In the 
alternative, if it was error not to continue the discovery period, 
there are again independent grounds to support the award of 
summary judgment to defendants. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment 
granted to defendant Dr. Okubo should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this<^ day of October, 1988. 
STRONG & HANNI 
B Y ; ^ 
XR. Scott William 7 
G. Eric Nielson 
Attorneys for Dr. Okubo 
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Q It was never raised by you? 
A No, because I was told at the hospital she was 
developing a breathing pattern and they made me feel like such 
a fool for taking her in there when she quit breathing, that I 
thought I was being foolish to even ask about it. 
Q Did Dr. Okubo ever raise the subject with you of 
SIDS? 
A No. 
Q Did you tell him of the incident that occurred on 
July 4? 
A He was aware of it. They called him from the 
hospital. I called him the next day, also. 
Q But did you, at this visit on the 16th, did you 
actually tell him about what had happened? 
A Yes. We discussed it shortly. I mostly discussed 
it with the nurse. 
Q What did he tell you he believed the problem was? 
A She was creating a breathing pattern. 
Q And not to worry about it? 
A Not to worry. 
Q Was that the end of the conversation? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you seen him since that date? 
A July 16? 
Q July 16. 
rnwwwp]?T7.P.D TRANSCRIPT 
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A No, I haven't. 
Q You didn't take her back in to see him again at all, 
then? 
A No. 
Q Why not? 
A Because I felt he was careless. 
Q What caused you to feel that he was careless? 
A Because I was in one door and out the other. There 
was two doors on the examining room and they ushered you in 
one room and out the other, like an assembly line. That's how 
I felt. 
Q So you made a conscious decision at that time not to 
go back and see him? 
A Yes, I was going to look for another physician. 
Q And did you? 
A I found one — yeah, I looked and I found another 
physician at the end of August. 
Q Who was that? 
A Dr., McClellan. 
Q I guess the next date that really comes up with 
regard to July is the July 4 incident; is that correct? You 
said that you told Dr. Okubo about the breathing problem on 
July 4? 
A Yes. 
Q Tell us what happened on July 4. 
rnMPTTTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
ADDENDUM "B 
1 Q. I understand that you did see Tiffany Butterfield 
2 You are referring to your office records now, I assume. 
3 A. Yes, I am. 
4 Q. Could you tell me when you first saw her? 
5 A. I first saw her on August the 31st, 1984. 
6 Q. When you saw her, did her morher give you any 
7 kind of history? 
8 A. Normally you always take a history. 
9 Q. Can you tell me, then, what history you were 
10 provided with at that time? 
11 A. That she was a normal birth, seven pounds, 
12 eighteen and a half-inch baby, that had no difficulty 
13 with pregnancy, that the chief complaint at that time 
14 was she had a rash, or she had a whitish material on 
15 the inside of her mouth, and that was a thrush and that 
16 was treated. 
17 Q. Did she mention at this time any apnea or problem.^ 
18 with breathing? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q, Did she mention any problems at all besides 
21 the rash? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Did you then schedule just a routine follow 
24 up or did she call the next time she was to visit you? 
25 A. I would have normally scheduled a follow up. 
7. 
1 I don't recall whether I asked her to return specifically 
2 or whether that was her own idea, but I normally would 
3 have asked her to come back and then to start her 
4 immunization schedule. 
5 ft Did she report on this first visit any complaint 
6 of listlessness? 
7 A. No. 
8 ft In Tiffany? 
9 A. No-
tO ft Or congestion? 
11 A. No. 
12 ft What were your impressions, if you can remember? 
13 A. Just that she was a healthy baby and she had 
14 oral thrush. 
15 ft When you saw her the next time, can you tell 
16 us the date and what your findings were. 
17 A. It was 9-27-84. Basically it was the same 
18 thing, it was normal well baby examination. Her head, 
19 ears, nose, eyes and throat were within normal limits. 
20 Fontanel was normal, the tear ducts were open, the yeast 
21 infection, intraorally was recovering with the microstatin 
22 I had given her. Her chest was clear, normal sinus rhythm. 
23 No abdominal masses, umbilicus was healed. No hernia, 
24 no hip click. Feet were normal. DPT and oral polio 
25 were given that day and she was scheduled for return 
1 at two months. 
2 Q. At this time was it your understanding that 
3 you were this child's primary physician? 
4 A. As far as I knew, 
5 Q. Was it your understanding that she was seeing 
6 you exclusively or did you know whether she was seeing 
7 other physicians, or did you know either way? 
8 A. I don't recall, honestly. 
9 Q. Do you recall on this second office visit having 
10 any discussions regarding apnea, congestion? 
11 A. She didn't relate that the child was having 
12 any difficulties like that. 
13 Q. I won't go into the specific office visits. 
14 I also have a copy of your records but I did want to 
15 ask you a couple of questions about it. 
16 Were you also seeing the mother at this time 
17 as a patient? 
18 A. Yes, I believe I was. 
19 Q. Do you recall seeing her in c.he emergency room 
20 during the same* period of time? 
21 A. It would have been about the same period of 
22 time but I don't have my records in front of me. I can't 
23 tell you exactly which date. 
24 Q. You don't have the records for the mother? 
25 A. Well, that wasn't what we were supposed to 
1 talk about today. I thought it was just about Tiffany 
2 and s o — 
3 Q. Those are the only records you have? 
4 A. I could get them but, I haven't reviewed them 
5 or anything like that s o — 
6 Q. We will stick with Tiffany just to stay sequential) 
7 then, and then we could talk about the mother more later. 
8 J A. Okay. 
9 Q. So your understanding, then, you saw the child 
10 six times; is that correct? 
11 A. Actually I believe I saw the child— 
12 Q. Five. Excuse me. 
13 A. Five times. 
14 Q. Because the December 22nd visit was just with 
15 the mother? 
16 A. Yes, it was. 
17 Q. And during these five visits from August until 
18 December, did the mother mention anything to you about 
19 problems with breathing, or problems with congestion, 
20 or listlessness, discoloration, any of those things? 
21 A. Yes, on one occasion. I'm sorry. Two occasions. 
22 She told me on November the 5th that the child had been 
23 having some mucus in her nose and that was treated. 
24 I thought she had a serous otitis media and 
25 when I saw her back on the 30th that had resolved. 
10 
1 I did see her again on the 14th of December 
2 and she related that the child had mucus in her upper 
3 respiratory tract. The previous treatment had been effecti\j 
4 so I reinstituted it, and then I did not see her after 
5 that. 
6 Q. Could you tell me from your notes on the 14th 
7 what was the previous treatment? The Rondec? 
8 A. Rondec, DM. 
9 Q. And so you continued it because— 
10 A. It recurred. 
1! Q. It recurred. Because it had resolved it by 
12 the 30th? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And could you explain to me what SOM is again? 
15 A. Serous otitis media. 
16 Q. And what is that? 
17 A. That is where you have fluid behind the ear 
18 but it is not of an infectious nature. 
19 Q. And was the condition complained of on the 
20 14th the same thing; SOM, or was it something different? 
21 A. No. That was what she had on that one occasion 
22 on the 5th of November and on the 14th of December that 
23 was not present. 
24 Q. And the complaint of the 14th was just— 








































And the information given to you by the parents? 
No, sir. 
Okay. Let me ask one more thing. I am hazy 
whole deal. Have you been retained as an expert 
to testify for Mr. Grindstaff? 
Not that I know of. 
Has he asked you to testify in court in this 
GRINDSTAFF: I have never talked to him. 
WITNESS: I have never met him before or talked 
to him on the phone, and so, no, I have not been retained 




(By Mr. Garner) And so have the plaintiffs 
u to testify in their behalf? 
They asked if I would be willing to do that 
and I said, "Why don't you see how the case goes along 
for you, and this might be something that is going to 





but let's not cross bridges before—" 
GARNER: I think that is all I have. 
. BRENNAN: I have a couple more. 
EXAMINATION 
MRS. BRENNAN: Q. Are you still seeing Mrs. Butter-
47. 
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R. Scott Williams, #3498 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on 




DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL, 
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS W. 
NIELSON, M.D., PH.D. 
Civil No. C86-9250 
Judge Richard Moffatt 
-oooOooo-
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Dennis W. Nielson, M.D., Ph.D., being first duly sworn 
on oath deposes and states: 
1. I am a physician licensed to practice in the State 
of Utah, having a specialty in pediatric medicine. I am 
a board certified pediatrician and am presently an assistant 
professor of pediatrics at the Department of Pediatrics at 
the University of Utah Medical Center. Of particular interest 
ocjoos: U J
to this case involving a claimed sudden infant death syndrome, 
I am board certified in pediatric pulmonology a«d am presently 
the director of the Pediatric Pulmonary Function Laboratory 
at the University of Utah Hospital and Primary Children's 
Medical Center. I am also a member of the Sudden Infant 
Death Advisory Council of the Utah State Department of Health. 
A complete summary of my expertise and qualifications is 
included within the attached Curriculum Vitae to this affidavit. 
2. At the request of counsel for Dr. David Okubo, I 
have reviewed the medical records of the deceased infant. 
Tiffany Ruth Butterfield, and the depositions of Albert John 
and Angela Butterfield. 
3. That I am familiar with the standard of care required 
of a pediatrician for treatntent of the symptoms as reported 
to Dr. Nickol and Dr. Okubo by the plaintiffs on July 4, 
and July 16, 1984. 
4. That after a thorough review of the medical records 
and the depositions involved in this case I am of the opinion 
that Dr. Okubo did not deviate from the standard of care 
required of him in the treatment rendered to the deceased 
infant through July 16, 1984. 
5. More specifically, even if Dr. Okubo was told by 
Mrs. Butterfield of the incident that allegedly occurred 
on July 4, 1984, and that was referred to in her deposition, 
I am still of the opinion that Dr. Okubo would not have been 
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required to order or suggest a home monitor, assuming as 
plaintiff has testified that there had only been the one 
incident prior to seeing Dr. Okubo and that the child was 
breathing normally and appeared healthy when finally presented 
to the emergency room on July 4, 1984, and also when presented 
to Dr. Okubo on July 16, 1984. Although some physicians 
may choose to order a home monitor for circumstances similar 
to what the plaintiffs reported occurred on July 4, 1984, 
the standard of care would clearly not have required Dr. 
Okubo to order one or refer the patient to another physician 
who would do so. 
6. In addition, even if Dr. Okubo had ordered a home 
monitor there is insufficient data or literature available 
to conclude with medical probability that it would have prevented 
this particular infant's death. 
Further affiant saith naught. 
DATED this iQ^ day of December, 1987. 
Dennis W. Nielson, M.D., Ph.D. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this lQth day of December, 
1987. 
•tary Public - Resi 
Leona K. Hollingsworth 
Bountiful, UT 
^J^^ttd^tt?1--
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
April 25, 1991. 
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hand delivered to: 
David L. Grindstaff, Esq, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
395 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 





IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT 0? SALT LAX2 COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA 
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians 
and parents of and on 




DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL, 
ar.d HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY 
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OP H. BARRY 
JACOBS, M.D. 
Civil No. C36-9250 
Judge Richard Moffatt 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) ss. 
H. Barry Jacobs, M.D., being first duly sworn on oath 
deposes and states: 
1. I am a physician licensed in the State of Maryland 
and am a Board Certified Surgeon since 1974. **-ha»e *part 
experience in Emergency Room care at four hospitaj.1, and 
Pediatrics, having cared for patient's in'priya^f practlcjT^nd 
hospitals, *fw^T!^T»,p»H^<n.4^,^»^n*«p4lni in Bilhifaflt?TTi D.C. 
2. I have reviewed the emergency room and pediatric 
records of the Decedent, Tiffiany R. Butterfield, as well as the 
depositions of her Parents, Albert and Angela Butterfield, and 
have met with Albert Butterfield. 
3. I am familiar with the Standard of Care, applicable 
in 1984, required in pediatrics and emergency room medicine, as 
well as hospital responsibility for adequate record keeping and 
availability of previous records during later follow up care for 
a related complaint. 
4. After a thorough review of the available data I am of 
the opinion that care below an acceptable standard was provided 
to Tiffany Butterfield by Dr. Nichol, Dr. Okubo, and the Holy 
Cross Jordan Valley Hospial with the specifics related below. 
5. Assuming the facts as related in the parent's 
depositions to be true, the history of present illness and/or 
chief complaints gathered by the hospital nursing staff and Dr. 
Nichols on 07/04/84 fail to detail the fact that actual apnea was 
observed by the parents and there was cyanosis* Also omitted was 
the fact that the child required stimulation such as pinching or 
shaking before respiration was resumed. Given the lack of 
significant findings on exam to account for respiratory 
compromise and/or the apparent concern and anxiety of the 
paints, such an omission contributed directly to the failure to 
consider SIDS in a differential diagnosis. 
6. When the child was taken as directed for pediatric 
evaluation on 07/16/84 by Dr. Okubo a vague reference was made 
concerning the fact that the child did have unexplained 
respiratory problems. Once again, an inadequate history lead to 
an incomplete assessment and second failure to consider the need 
to rule out SIDS as an etiological possibility. 
7. The second emergency room visit of 08/16/84 did 
contain a somewhat unclear reference to periods of apnea not 
associated with cyanosis. This is refuted by the parent's 
deposition in that the child had been observed to have cyanosis 
with the apnea and once again required stimulation while being 
transported to the hospital that did -resolve the cynosis. 
8. It is alleged that the prior emergency room record of 
07/04/84 could not be obtained* £*ch data- should have been 
available. This would have reinforced the fact that unexplained 
respiratory problems existed and a differential diagnosis 
including SIDS should have been developed. 
9. The physical exam as recorded by Dr. Nichols on 
08/16/84 failed to note any cardiac findings. The discharge 
instructions did imply some need for monitoring the infant and 
that the child should be re-evaluated by the Pediatrician. The 
child's pa-rents insist they did not receive any follow-up 
recommendations and therefore were unaware of the need for same. 
10. There are no records available to detail what was 
recorded during a third emergency room visit on or about 
10/01/84. Theparent's deposition £«i*cates the child again had 
an apneic'episode and required stimulation. The deposition goes 
on to insist that a concern about SIDS was raised and discounted 
by Dr. Nichols as a possibility even though no other etiology had 
surfaced to explain-the child's problems or account for the 
degree of parental concern and/or anxiety. 
11. On 12/19/84 Tiffany Butterfield did indeed die from 
SIDS. This would easily have been avoided to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty by either in-hospital observation and 
monitoring for apnea followed by the Issuance of a home apnea 
monitor, or simply arranging for a -home apnea monitor. 
12. While one could perhaps argue that such care was not 
warrented following the 07/04/84 emergency visit, I am of the 
opinion that such care was justified after the 07/16/84 pediatric 
check-up and/or the 08/16/84 and 10/01/84 emergency room visits. 
Drs« Okubo and Nichols and a duty to insure necessary follow-up 
was carried out and failed to do so. 
13. The above, in my opinion, constitutes care below an 
accepted standard (negligence) and was the proximate cause of the 
child's demise from SIDS. 
Further affiant saith naught. 
DATED this^I day of December, 1987. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J2j^ day of 
December, 1987. 
Notary Public - Residing at: 
Faye Araaim 
Reston, VA 
My Commission Expires: 
tty Commission Expires May 11 !M9 
